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azprom’s situation has become increasingly difficult since January’s notorious gas crisis. From being 
ranked as the world’s fourth most-valuable corporation in 2008 with a market capitalisation of nearly 
$300 billion, its position has now dropped into the low thirties, with its cap italisation shrinking to 
around $90 billion. 
Even more worryingly for Gazprom is the fact that the natural gas market is changing in a number of ways. 
First, the pressures of the economic and financial crisis have led to a considerable depression in natural gas 
demand. Domestic consumption in Russia, the second largest gas market in size after the United States, has 
considerably fallen. The real problem, however, lies in a drop in exports that provide Gazprom with the 
majority of its revenue. Western Europe alone has reduced its Russian gas imports already by up to 50 billion 
cubic meters (bcm), with Germany and Italy responsible for nearly half that drop, while Turkey has bought 
25% less gas from Russia in the first half of 2009 compared to last year. This is laying the ground for 
commercial disputes between Gazprom and European companies such as E.ON, ENI and Botas, since they 
are buying less gas from the Russian energy giant than stipulated in their long-term ‘take-or-pay’ contracts. 
This undelivered gas is currently valued at roughly $2.5 billion. While Gazprom insists its customers pay up, 
European energy companies claim there should be more flexibility in their contracts, stressing that Gazprom 
itself is failing to fulfil its obligations to buy its requisite amount of Turkmen gas and that Prime Minister 
Putin has so far allowed cash-strapped Ukraine to buy much less gas than it is contractually obliged to. In 
addition, they point out that they did not take the Russian energy major to court over its breach of contract 
during the gas crisis when its failure to transit gas through Ukraine left Europe in the cold. 
Both sides will have to come to a suitable arrangement; this is particularly necessary given the fact that 
noone can guarantee an increase in future natural gas consumption. Quite to the contrary, according to the 
latest World Energy Outlook published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), natural gas consumption 
is expected to fall by 5% by 2015 and 17% by 2030 compared to a business-as-usual scenario if 
environmental policies such as energy efficiency and the expansion of renewable energy are put into place. 
Similarly, a recent report by Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) states that the European Union 
is able to cut back its consumption by 125 bcm per annum – similar to consumption levels in the early 1990s 
– by 2030 using existing technologies to increase energy efficiency. 
Second, the global gas market has steadily moved from a seller’s to a buyer’s market. New liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) supplies are causing a glut on the market that is depressing prices on the spot market. Back in 
August, for example, the forward gas price in the United Kingdom for delivery in winter was around 40 
pence ($0.66) a therm, down from more than 100 pence ($1.64) in June 2008. This also explains the reduced 
imports of Russian gas as European industries decided it was better business to buy gas independently or 
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through other traders for $116 per thousand cubic meter (mcm) than for over $287/mcm under Gazprom’s 
long-term contracts.1 
These new circumstances marked by high oil-indexed long-contract prices versus low spot prices are also re-
igniting discussions on their decoupling.2 Algerian Energy Minister Chakib Khelil as well as Nobuo Tanaka, 
head of the IEA, have both recently indicated that the link between oil and gas prices could be broken. 
Indeed, the continued rationale for linkage is questionable, as argued by Jonathan Stern, since the original 
rationale “that end-users had a real choice between burning gas and oil products, and would switch to the 
latter if given a price incentive to do so” has largely disappeared.3 This issue will also impact on the 
development of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF),4 as its members might be tempted to operate 
like OPEC and rework the methods of calculating gas prices. The group’s next ministerial meeting on 9 
December 2009 in Doha will, besides electing a Secretary-General, therefore undoubtedly discuss this topic. 
This won’t be without controversy. As some of its members primarily rely on LNG exports (Qatar and 
Algeria) and some on pipeline exports (Russia), interests are likely to diverge. This is particularly the case 
given the fact that Gazprom has lost pipeline gas volumes to cheaper LNG and does not enjoy the same level 
of flexibility as LNG producers do. Furthermore, Russia might also be inclined to maintain a link to oil 
prices as its Russian sour grade crude is speculated to eventually become an Asian benchmark oil price with 
increasing oil exports to Asia through the ESPO (East Siberia-Pacific Ocean) pipeline, which will end up 
carrying up to 1 million barrels a day. 
Intense debate over the pricing mechanisms can therefore be expected within the GECF, and it is likely that 
Gazprom will want to go it alone and come to a separate agreement with its European counterparts 
concerning prices in order to uphold its dominance on the European gas market. 
Third, other players are, albeit slowly, increasing their market share. Qatar is bringing on-line a range of new 
LNG supplies, the United States is focusing on its massive unconventional shale-gas reserves, Azerbaijan is 
eager to sell its gas to the European Union through the planned Nabucco pipeline, Iran has signed a deal with 
Turkey to develop the South Pars gas field, the largest in the world, and both have recently reached an 
agreement to transit up to 35 bcm of Turkmen gas to Turkey. In addition, Gazprom is having to come to 
terms with the independent gas producers on the Russian market. Novatek, Russia’s largest independent gas 
producer, is one case in point. It has recently won a contract to supply up to 7 bcm to state-controlled power 
generation utility OGK-1, which has traditionally bought its supplies from Gazprom. Novatek was able to 
offer a better price and payment terms than the Russian gas giant since the latter is generally inflexible when 
it comes to domestic pricing as its tariffs are set by government regulations aiming to avoid monopolistic 
price fixing. 
It is without a doubt, however, that Gazprom will remain a key actor abroad as well as home. After all, the 
Russian gas major is not the only one suffering. Other players in the business, particularly in the Middle East 
and North Africa, are also feeling the crunch; they are arguably in an even worse situation. With a booming 
population, these countries are actually facing an increasing domestic demand for cheap subsidised natural 
gas. This is eating into public coffers and making upstream investments commercially unattractive. In 
addition, it actually limits their ability to export, thereby not only reducing crucial revenue streams but also 
their market share.5 Iran is a particularly pertinent example. Holding the third-largest reserves in the world, it 
produced 116.3 bcm in 2008 while consuming 117.6 bcm the very same year.6 As such, Iran’s contribution 
to providing Europe with energy should definitely not be over-estimated, particularly in the context of the 
sanctions associated with the nuclear stand-off. In this vein, Gazprom’s situation in Europe, with its fixed 
pipelines and massive gas trade, is relatively secure. 
                                                     
1 “Gazprom chases multi-billion-dollar compensation”, Rossiysskaya Gazeta, 9 October 2009. 
2 For an excellent examination on this subject, see Jonathan Stern, “Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: Is 
a transition away from oil product-linked pricing inevitable and imminent?”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
September 2009. 
3 Ibid., p. 1. 
4 The GECF consists of Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan (observer), Libya, Nigeria, 
Norway (observer), Qatar, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. 
5 I am grateful to Dr Hakim Darbouche of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies for drawing my attention to this point. 
6 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009 (see http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview).  
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Nevertheless, the current market conditions of reduced consumption/oversupply and consequently low prices 
on the spot market are extremely unfavourable. The gas major is facing excess capacity and the loss in 
exports is significantly affecting its balance sheet. In the first half of 2009, its profit was 48% lower 
compared to the same timeframe in 2008, while its debt grew by 31%. At this point in time Gazprom can 
therefore count itself lucky that it did not heed the calls of numerous commentators – myself included – for 
greater investment in its gas fields. Had it done so, its current situation would have looked even worse. 
Whether this trend is set to continue will largely depend on how long it takes the economy to recover and 
boost demand as well as on the extent to which low-carbon policies such as energy efficiency and 
renewables are actually translated into action. Considering that the EU’s 20% energy efficiency target is still 
not binding, that the European Commission is finding it difficult to come out with another energy efficiency 
directive and that its member states are struggling to fulfil their renewable objectives, gas demand is likely to 
rise again in the medium-term with a rebounding economy. 
In the meantime, Gazprom is trying to deal with this new context in a number of ways. First and foremost, it 
has cut its investment programme for 2009 by $5 billion and has announced that it will delay the 
development of the Bovanenko field by one year (until 2012). Secondly, Prime Minister Putin has put forth a 
resolution ordering Gazprom to relax payment conditions for industrial users on the Russian gas market in 
the hope that this will stimulate domestic demand. Third, the Russian gas monopoly has started turning its 
attention to new markets, in particular China – a major emerging consumer – with Gazprom and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) preliminarily agreeing on a framework that would open the way for 
Russia to supply up to 70 bcm per annum by 2014-15 through two new pipelines. This draft agreement, 
which has been negotiated since 2003, would benefit Gazprom as it would increase its flexibility and allow 
some of its potential future excess supply to be offloaded. Fourth, Gazprom continues to cement its position 
in Europe, partially by reducing its own dependence on Ukraine’s transit system, through the construction of 
the North Stream and South Stream pipelines. Both pipelines have recently received a boost: North Stream 
has now obtained all of the necessary construction permits, with the exception of Germany’s, while South 
Stream has gained Ankara’s permission to pass through Turkish waters. This increases pressure on Bulgaria, 
whose new government was stalling on the project, since Gazprom is now able to route the pipeline through 
Turkey and Greece, thereby leaving Bulgaria out in the cold. 
These policies, some of them entailing higher risks than others, should in the short- to medium-term 
somewhat improve Gazprom’s current situation. 
In conclusion, the current economic conditions, coupled with a gas glut and the potential impact of 
sustainable energy policies, are increasing uncertainty in the gas market. While in recent years pundits 
believed that environmental policies would lead to a dash-for-gas in order to replace coal,7 and that Gazprom 
needed to correspondingly increase its upstream investments in order to meet that rising demand, the picture 
has turned out to be quite the opposite.  
Ultimately, it demonstrates the extreme difficulty in predicting future European gas demand.8 This is also the 
case because there are so many underlying interests in these guesstimates. Consumers, such as the European 
Union, will always call for greater investments in supply in order to ensure demand is met and create such 
abundance as to lead to lower prices, while producers, such as Gazprom, will want to have a balanced 
investment strategy that maximises profits.  
Coordination of consumers and producers might in principle help avoid drastic shocks. However, this has 
proved impossible in the oil market despite decades of massive oil price fluctuations. Meanwhile, the gas 
market was believed to offer more scope for cooperation because of the fixed nature of the land-bound 
pipeline networks, and the long-term contracts have exemplified this, even if the crucial gas-price question 
was pegged to the wildly gyrating oil price. But with low spot prices, increasing liquidity – due to an 
expansion of LNG supplies – and a panoply of new energy policies as well as diverging interests, the very 
nature of that market is slowly being eroded. In this context, the outlook for coordination does not look 
promising. 
                                                     
7 An argument still legitimately advanced by Gazprom: see Alexander Medvedev’s speech at the VII International 
Forum – Gas of Russia 2009, 17 November 2009. 
8 Jonathan Stern, “Future Gas Production in Russia: Is the concern about lack of investment justified?”, Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, October 2009. 
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